3. If, then, reasoning appears to hold the mastery over the passions which stand in the way of temperance, such as gluttony and lust,
4. it surely also and manifestly has the rule over the affections which are contrary to justice, such as malice; and of those which are hindrances to manliness, as wrath, and pain, and fear.
5. How, then, is it, perhaps some may say, that reasoning, if it rule the affections, is not also master of forgetfulness and ignorance? They attempt a ridiculous argument.
6. For reasoning does not rule over its own affections, but over such as are contrary to justice, and manliness and temperance, and prudence; and yet over these, so as to withstand, without destroying them.
7. I might prove to you, from many other considerations, that religious reasoning is sole master of the passions;